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INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER
AND RESPECT FOR THE LAW
CHARLES A. LowE*
It is a fact well known to the profession, that very few lawyers are dishonest. This does not comport, of course, with the
rather current belief that the lawyer and the honest man must
of necessity be two separate individuals.
Large and varied interests are constantly entrusted to the
hands of the lawyer with such a slight percentage of loss on
the part of the client as to be almost negligible. Lawyers know
the truth of this situation, and know that no matter what may
be the popular estimate of the lawyer, he is in fact going along
quietly caring for and transacting the business entrusted to
him with competency and fidelity.
There are, of course, exceptions in the profession, but they
are rare birds who generally flit into the fields of the law and
as rapidly flit away again never to be heard of more.
Through a series of years there has been built up a definite
set of self-imposed standards of conduct. Living up to these
standards is the first duty and responsibility of any one who
hopes to stay in the profession.
The practice of the law is changing beneath our very eyes.
More and more, we are losing the slap-bang, roaring-bull tactics
and are looking upon the trial of a case in court, for what it
really is, as defined by the codes of some of the states, a judicial examination of the facts. Certainly the old methods, now
so happily becoming obsolete, are giving way to an earnest,
sincere and dispassionate examination of the facts under the
control of the court with an eye single to the ascertainment of
truth. Recently while engaged in a cause in a Federal court in
another state, the trial judge remarked to an over zealous attorney: "Now let's take this a little more quietly. I think a little
less heat will help to bring out the facts." Then, quietly, he
reminded the witness that all they were trying to do was develop the true state of facts. Both counsel and witness sub* Of the Lawrenceburg bar. Judge Lowe delivered this address before
the 37th Judicial Circuit Bar Association, August 8th, 1933.
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sided immediately and the trial continued in a much quieter and
more judicial atmosphere.
We refer to this matter for the reason that the legal profession and the courts are criticized for delay more than any one
thing, and delay is caused more by a Bourbon-like adherence
to needless forms, ceremonies and archaic methods of procedure and practice than any other thing. The litigant wants action. The business man wants a prompt decision. The State
wants a prompt and speedy settlement of disputes.
This can best be accomplished by an orderly, quiet trial in
which from first to last the earnest endeavor of counsel and the
trial judge is a prompt arrival at the facts of the case and the
application of the law to these facts when determined. Could
not and would not the lawyer get the same fees, and get them
quicker if cases were universally tried and disposed of finally
in three months instead of three years. Would not the business
man be better able to adjust his business affairs if suits involving the affairs of his business could be decided within such a
time so that he would not be compelled to absorb large items of
expense brought about solely by delay? Would not the State be
more nearly performing the very function which justifies it in
attempting to control the settlement of private disputes, if such
disputes could be promptly disposed of so that Time could begin
its healing process rather than to have disputes drag their weary
way through the courts for years, disrupting neighborhoods by
the bitterness of the contention.
We all agree that these things are "consumations devoutly to
be wished" and we all agree that litigants, courts, lawyers, and
society in general would be benefited by a system that functioned
in this manner with respect to civil cases. With regard to the
enforcement of the criminal law, the effect would be the same.
It has passed into a maxim that it is the prompt, swift and
certain infliction of punishment that deters criminals rather
than the severity of such punishment. We have learned that
the best way to train a dog is to punish him promptly for an
offense, while the dog still remembers what the offense was. It
is the same with criminals. They should be punished for offenses before they and the public in general have forgotten about
the matter. Thus the punishment seems connected with the
offense and to flow from the same, and the example has effect.
Thus in every department of the law we see that a prompt
and speedy administration of Justice is the much-sought after
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and desired result. Why, then, should the lawyer interpose himself as an obstacle to the consumation of these universal desires.
It is a current belief that progress in any profession comes, and
must come, from those outside the profession. This has been
true in the past to some extent with the legal profession. And
yet there have always been forward-looking individuals who
were progressive enough to stand for sweeping changes in the
practice.
Let us consider for example some of the anomalies still existing in our law. It was wholly unfair for the Prosecuting
Attorney to call attention to the fact that the defendant had
not testified in the days when the law did not permit him to
testify. The disability of the defendant has long since been removed, yet the restriction still remains. Ohio has abolished it
and other states have also. Yet there are lawyers who will
oppose it today and insist upon the restriction as essential to
a fair criminal trial.
In England, appeals, are disposed, as a rule within sixty days.
Formalities are unknown. No long record is required. The
parties are required to state informally the questions raised by
the appeal and these and these alone are briefed, argued and
decided. There a business man can have a litigated case, involving a contract tried, appealed and finally determined during his
own lifetime.
We have heard much of late, of the proposed innovation of
placing the "Rule Making power" back in the courts. Who ever
took it away? Why should any other branch or department of
Government have the right to lay down rules and regulations for
the courts, when the Constitution expressly confers judicial
power upon courts and courts alone. Who but the Courts themselves, upon whom is cast the responsibility of exercising judicial power, should make the rules for the application of such
power? Would the Legislature, for example, submit to have
its rules of procedure determined and controlled by another
and entirely separate department of Government? Would the
Supreme Court or the Legislature have the right to pass rules
determining how the Governor shall exercise his constitutional
prerogatives of an executive and administrative nature?
What is needed is a set of rules of procedure under which the
Courts can function, as they were supposed to function, "speedily and without delay" as required by the mandate of the Constitution. Anything less than this is not carrying out the ex-
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pressed will of the people and is a subversion of the judicial
power delegated by the people to the Courts.
I shall not draw out the matter, further. The law business
is slipping away from the lawyers and into the hands of Boards
and Commissions, which are not hog-tied and fettered by rules
of procedure and practice.
Why does the average lawyer oppose those things which will
make for the prompt and speedy decision of causes when all of
his interests lie in the opposite direction?
What does it matter to the lawyer what rules of procedure are
prescribed for his client's case? He can have no personal- interest in the matter. He should not oppose changes which will
result in a more prompt and speedy adjudication of controversies. He can play the game no matter what the rules are so
long as they affect him and his lawyer-adversary alike. It is
the client's cause that is decided, not the advocate's.
The greatest individual responsibility resting upon the lawyer today is to fall in line with the demand for a speedy and
prompt administration of justice. This is expected of him and
this will restore business to the profession that is now drifting
away to more speedy tribunals.

